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Abstract In this paper I present a dynamic-epistemic hybrid logic for reasoning
about information and intention changes in situations of strategic interaction. I pro-
vide a complete axiomatization for this logic, and then use it to study intentions-based
transformations of decision problems.
Keywords Intentions · Rationality · Interaction · Transformation of decision
problems · Fixed points
The capacity of human agents to deliberate in advance and to form intentions about
future actions is a central aspect of rational agency, and at least since (Harman 1976)
and (Bratman 1987) this aspect has been studied extensively in philosophy of action.
Among the distinguishing features of intentions identified in this literature is the fact
that these states generate specific expectations, both about oneself and in situations
of interaction. The expectations are, in turn, an important anchor for inter-temporal
and inter-personal coordination, and they are the building blocks of many theories
of shared agency (Velleman 1997; Bratman 1999). Philosophers of action have also
repeatedly pointed out that intentions bring in a specific dynamic in deliberation. They
induce transformations of decision problems by filtering the set of options, and by
triggering deliberation on means (Bratman 1987; Bratman et al. 1988; Roy 2009).
These philosophical insights on the role of intentions in rational agency find a
natural environment to be developed further in contemporary epistemic game theory
and dynamic epistemic logic. Epistemic game theory offers an extensive toolbox with
which to study the relation between mutual expectations and interactive rationality
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(Aumann 1999; Brandenburger 2007). Dynamic epistemic logic, on the other hand,
provides a unifying framework for the analysis of dynamic phenomena in interaction
(van Benthem to appear), in particular those pertaining to transformations of models
of mutual expectations (van Benthem 2007a,b; Baltag et al. 2009) and preferences
(Liu 2008; Girard 2008).
Despite this obvious congeniality of interest between the philosophical theory of
intentions, on the one hand, and epistemic game theory and dynamic epistemic logic on
the other, there has so far been very little contact between the two. Intentions are absent
from contemporary epistemic game theory, and the existing literature on intention in
decision theory has focused on the rationality of making and keeping commitments;
see for instance (McClennen 1990) and (Gul and Pesendorfer 2001). Logical theo-
ries of intentions, on the other hand, have mostly considered the relations between
intentions and other propositional attitudes, such as desires, goals and beliefs, in the
single-agent case. See for instance (Cohen and Levesque 1990; Georgeff et al. 1999;
Wooldridge 2000). These theories have not touched on the role of mutual expectations
generated by intentions, nor on the transformations of decision problem that these
attitudes induce in situations of interaction.
In this paper I draw from these three traditions in the foundations of rational agency
to develop a dynamic epistemic (hybrid) logic with which to reason about information
and intention changes in strategic interaction. I provide a complete axiomatization
for this logical system and use it to further the investigation set out in (van Hees and
Roy 2008) and (Roy 2009) on the role of intentions in strategic interaction. I answer
four questions that have been left open in these earlier two papers. I first provide an
epistemic characterization of the operation there called “cleaning” of strategic games,
showing that it corresponds to a public announcement of “intention-rationality”—the
fact that the agents do not choose strategies that would exclude the achievement of
their intentions—under the condition that these intentions are common knowledge.
Second, I show how this operation behaves in situations where intentions are not
common knowledge, i.e. when there is uncertainty about intentions. Third, I define
alternative transformations of decision problems, and study their relation with van
Hees and Roy’s original cleaning operation. Finally, again using the resources of the
dynamic formalism, I study the iterated behaviour of these two operations. I show that
they “stabilize” in the long run, and that they lead to related but nevertheless different
decision situations. Along the way I briefly touch the question of intention revision.
All in all this shows that the logical framework proposed here brings in new insights,
both to the philosophical theory of intentions and the epistemic theory of games.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 1, I develop the dynamic-epistemic
hybrid logical system. In Sect. 1.1, I introduce the structures I study, namely games
in strategic forms and epistemic frames with intentions. In Sect. 1.2, I introduce the
logical language to talk about the static features of these structure—strategies, inten-
tions and information—and provide a complete axiomatization for it. In Sect. 1.3, I
add public announcement operators to this language, and provide a complete axiomat-
ization for these as well. In Sect. 2, I move to applications of this logical system. I
show in Sect. 2.1 that the notion of cleaning of strategy sets proposed by van Hees and
Roy (2008) corresponds, in the present logical framework, to a public announcement
of “intention-rationality” under the condition that intentions are common knowledge.
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En route to relaxing this assumption, in Sect. 2.2, I study an alternative announcement
or way to clean a strategy set; one that takes the information of the agents into account.
In Sect. 2.3, I use the logical system to compare the two forms of cleaning, in both their
one-shot and iterated versions. Section 3 concludes: the lengthier proofs are presented
in the Appendix.
1 Logic for intentions and information dynamics in strategic games
1.1 Games in strategic form and epistemic frames with intentions
In the background of the present analysis are agents, actions, outcomes and pref-
erences, which are the basic ingredients of games in strategic form (Osborne and
Rubinstein 1994, p. 11). Such games are situations in which a number of agents must
choose simultaneously among a set of actions or strategies. The combination of all
these choices determines the outcome of the game, and agents have their own prefer-
ences over all possible outcomes. Here, I take combinations of strategies, one for each
agent, as outcomes of the game. It is common to assume that the preferences of the
agents induce a reflexive, transitive and total ordering of the outcome.
Definition 1 (Games in strategic form) A game in strategic form is a tuple G = 〈A,
{Si ,≤i }i∈A〉 such that:
– A is a finite set of agents.
– Si is a non-empty and finite set of strategies for i . A tuple σ ∈ i∈ASi is called a
strategy profile. I write σ(i) for i ’s component in σ .
– ≤i is a binary preference relation on i∈ASi .
An example of a game in strategic form, here a coordination game, is displayed
in Table 1. In this simple scenario there are two players, Ann and Bob, the former
choosing a row and the latter a column. Each has two strategies available: either go
to Restaurant A or Restaurant B. Their preferences are represented by the numerical
utility values in each cell of the table, i.e. at each strategy profile of the game, with
σ ≤i σ ′ if and only is the value for i of σ is greater or equal than the value of σ ′ for i .
In this example Ann’s utility values are represented on the left side, and Bob’s on the
right side of each cell.
Preferences stay in the background throughout this paper. I do agree that investi-
gating the relation between intentions and preferences is of great importance for any
theory of interactive decision making with intentions, and that game-theoretical anal-
ysis of interaction can hardly start without preferences. In this paper, however, I focus
on another important aspect of intention-based reasoning in interaction, namely the
Table 1 A coordination game Ann\Bob Restaurant A Restaurant B
Restaurant A 1, 1 0, 0
Restaurant B 0, 0 1, 1
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fact that intentions induce “transformations” of decision problems. As we shall see,
this aspect raises interesting issues for the theory of intentions in interaction, and so
even without taking preferences explicitly into account. What is more, the present
logical framework allows for a straightforward extension to preferences, along the
line of van Benthem et al. (2008) and van Hees and Roy (2008).
The real loci of the present analysis are not games in strategic forms but rather
what I call epistemic frames with intentions, which supplement the basic ingredients
of the former with a representation of the information available to the agents and
of the intentions they might have formed before entering the game. The epistemic
frames I use stem from two sources: on the one hand qualitative models of the agents’
epistemic states, most developed in the epistemic logic and epistemic game theory
literature (Fagin et al. 1995; Aumann 1999; van Benthem to appear), and on the other,
the representation of the agent’s intentions proposed by van Hees and Roy (2008).
Definition 2 (Epistemic frames with intentions) An epistemic frame with intentions
for the strategic game G is a tuple F = 〈W, f, {ιi ,∼i }∈A〉 such that:
– W is a non-empty and finite set of states.
– f : W → i∈ASi is a strategy function that assigns to each state w ∈ W a strategy
profile σ . For convenience I write w(i) for f (w)(i).
– ∼i ⊆ W 2 is an epistemic equivalence relation on W such that, for all w ∈ W and
all agents i ∈ A:
• if w ∼i w′ then w(i) = w′(i).
I use [w]i to denote {w′ : w ∼i w′}.
– ιi ⊆ W 2 is an intention compatibility relation on W such that, for all w ∈ W and
all agents i ∈ A:
• ιi (w) 	= ∅ and,
• if w ∼i w′ then ιi (w) = ιi (w′), with ιi (w) = {w′ : w ιi w′}.
A state of an epistemic frame with intentions represents the ex interim stage
(Aumann and Dreze 2008) in the play of a strategic game G where, to use a well-known
metaphor from (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944), the players have passed their
envelopes to the umpire, i.e. they have made their decision, but they are still uninformed
about the decisions and intentions of the others. The decision made by each agent at
a state, which I also call the choice of an agent at a state, is given by the function f ,
which assigns to all elements of W a strategy profile in G. Agent i’s information at a
state w is represented by the relations ∼i , which gives all states w′ which i considers
possible at w. This describes not only the first-order information of the agents, which
choices and intentions of the others they consider possible, but also their higher-order
information, i.e. what they consider possible that the others are considering possible.
I shall return briefly to higher-order information in Sect. 2.1. The relation ιi gives for
each state w the set of states which are compatible with i’s intentions at that state.
At this stage I only impose minimal constraints on the information and inten-
tions of the agents, and these are intended to reflect similar constraints frequently
used in the game-theoretical and philosophical literature. I first require each set
ιi (w) to be non-empty, so that intentions stay “internally consistent” (Bratman 2009).
I also assume that an agent “knows” what he chooses and intends, if w ∼i w′ then
123 [896]
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Fig. 1 An epistemic frame
(without intentions) for the
coordination game of Table 1.
The solid and dashed arrows
represent Ann and Bob’s relation
∼i , respectively. An assignment
of intentions and strategy choice
at each state is described in
Table 2
Table 2 An assignment of
intentions and strategy choice at
each state for Ann and Bob in
the epistemic frame of Fig. 1,
with A − A meaning that Ann
chooses Restaurant A, and Bob
as well
State f (w) ιAnn(w) ιBob(w)
w1 A − A {w1} {w1}
w2 A − B {w1} {w1, w2, w3, w4}
w3 B − A {w1, w3} {w1}
w4 B − B {w1, w3} {w1, w2, w3, w4}
w(i) = w′(i) and ιi (w) = ιi (w′), but at a given state he might consider that many
different choices and intentions are possible for the others (Aumann 1999; van Ben-
them 2007a,b; Brandenburger 2007). In cases where, for instance, there are states
w′, w′′ ∈ [w]i such that w′( j) 	= w′′( j), with i 	= j , I say that agent i is uncertain
about the choices of agent j at w, and similarly about j’s intentions if there are states
w′, w′′ ∈ [w]i such that ι j (w′) 	= ι j (w′), with i 	= j . Observe that I do not, at least
for now, impose a constraint relating what an agent intends to his information at a
given state. Such a constraint is discussed in Sect. 2.2.
An example of an epistemic frame with intentions for the coordination game of
Table 1 is shown in Fig. 1 and Table 2. At state w1, for instance, Ann chooses to go to
Restaurant A, w1(Ann) = A, and meeting Bob there is the only state compatible with
her intentions: ιAnn(w1) = {w1}. At that state she is uncertain about Bob’s choice and
intentions. She considers it possible both that Bob is choosing Restaurant A, which he
does at w1, and that he is choosing Restaurant B, which he does at w2. In the first case
she thinks that meeting her at this restaurant is also the only state compatible with his
intention, ιBob = {w1}, but in the second case she thinks that all states are compatible
with his intentions, so he does not intend anything in particular.
In this example the set of strategy profiles is in 1-to-1 correspondence with the set of
states, but in general this need not to be so. A given strategy profile might be assigned
to more than one state in a given model, and some profiles might not be assigned to
any state at all. In the first case, where a given profile is assigned to more than one
state, one can represent situations where some agents think that some strategy choices
of others might be supported by different intentions or information. When a given
profile σ is not assigned to any state in the model, we are in a situation where there is
absolutely no uncertainty, either first- or higher-order, regarding the fact that σ is not
played in this particular situation.
This generality allows one not only to model cases where the players have inten-
tions to reach certain outcomes in the game, i.e. to achieve certain strategy profiles,
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but also to model cases where the agents’ intentions bear on the intentions and infor-
mation of others as well. In other words, these models are well-suited to study cases of
higher-order intentions, just as they are well-suited to study higher-order information.
At state w3, one could for instance see Ann’s intentions as bearing on Bob’s, in the
sense that the states compatible with her intentions at w3 are exactly those where he
intends to meet her at Restaurant A. As the syntax of the logical language which will
be used to talk about epistemic frames with intentions makes clear, one can naturally
read such case as stating that, at w3, Ann “intends” that Bob intend to meet her at
Restaurant A. Observe that Ann’s intention at that state is different from Bob’s, as in
w3 they do not meet at Restaurant A. Of course is it open to debate whether agents can
have such genuine higher-order intentions, and the present models do not take a stance
on this issue. Rather, they provide a general framework for studying the consequences
of allowing, or not, such intentions, which I view as one of their assets.
1.2 Modal logic for intentions and information in strategic games
Each state of an epistemic frame with intentions provides us with a description of the
agents’ information, intentions and strategy choices, and in this section I introduce the
language which describes these static features. I show how to interpret this language
in epistemic frames with intentions and provide a complete axiomatization for the
class of such frames.
1.2.1 Language
I use a normal propositional modal language (Blackburn et al. 2006) to talk about
intentions and information in epistemic game frames. I also need to talk about the
strategy choices of agents at certain states. One way to approach this would be to
introduce specific proposition letters to denote strategies, or more precisely that an
agent chooses a certain strategy a state. This would provide us with the required addi-
tional expressive power to talk about strategy choices, but would remain an ad hoc
solution. Instead, I opt for hybrid logic (Areces and ten Cate 2007). Not only does this
extended modal logic provide us with the adequate level of expressive power to study
the relation between strategy choices, information and intentions, but it comes with a
well-behaved, and well-understood model-theory (ten Cate 2005). Furthermore, such
an extended modal language turns out to be sufficiently expressive to capture Nash
equilibrium in games in strategic forms (van Benthem et al. 2006; van Benthem et al.
2008), something which is of importance in connecting the present work with existing
game-theoretic analysis.
Definition 3 (Language for epistemic frames with intentions) Given a set of atomic
propositions prop and a set of nominals S, let LSG be the language recursively
defined as:
φ ::= p | σ | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | Kiφ | Iiφ |Eφ
123 [898]
Synthese (2009) 171:291–320 297
The propositional fragment of this LSG is standard. I write  and ⊥ for proposi-
tional tautologies and contradictions, respectively. Formulas of the form Kiφ should
be read “i knows that φ” and those of the form Iiφ as “i intends that φ.” These connec-
tives have duals: for ¬Ki¬φ I use ♦iφ, which means “i considers φ possible”, and for
¬Ii¬φ I use iiφ, meaning “φ is compatible i’s intentions.” Nominals σ are intended
as names for states in epistemic game frames. I often write σ(i) to refer to the strategy
that agent i plays at σ , i.e. as a shorthand for f (V (σ ))(i). The global modality Eφ,
which should be read as “there is a state where φ holds”, is part of the standard hybrid
toolkit. Its dual, which I write Aφ, is intended to mean “φ holds in all states”.
Mutual knowledge, “everybody knows that φ,” is definable in this language as a
conjunction of Kiφ for all agents in A. Common knowledge of φ is usually defined
as the (infinite) conjunction of “everybody knows that everybody knows that .... φ”
for all finite iterations of “everybody knows that”. The notion of common knowledge
will be useful in Sect. 2.1, to understand the epistemic assumption behind an existing
formalization of the “cleaning” of decision problems, but besides that it plays no role
in this paper. On the other hand, introducing the common knowledge operator brings in
technical complications in the axiomatization of the static and the dynamic languages
I use. For these two reasons I thus choose not to introduce common knowledge in
the logical syntax. I do, however, give a model-theoretic definition of this notion in
Appendix 4.1.
1.2.2 Epistemic models with intentions
I interpret LSG over epistemic models with intentions, which are epistemic frames
with intentions together with a valuation for the propositions and nominals. I often
write “models” instead of “epistemic models with intentions”.
Definition 4 (Models) A model M is an epistemic game frame F together with a
valuation function V : (prop ∪ S) → P(W ) that assigns to each propositional atom
and nominal the set of states where it is true, with the condition that for all σ ∈ S,
V (σ ) is a singleton. A pointed model is a pair M, w.
Definition 5 (Truth in LSG) M, w | x iff w ∈ V (x) for x ∈ prop ∪ S.
M, w | φ ∧ ψ iff M, w | φ and M, w | ψ
M, w | ¬φ iff M, w 	| φ
M, w | Eφ iff there is a w′ such that M, w′ | φ
M, w | Kiφ iff for all w′ such that w ∼i w′, M, w′ | φ.
M, w | Iiφ iff for all w′ ∈ ιi (w), M, w′ | φ.
I write ||φ||M for {w : M, w | φ}, and omit the M altogether when no confusion can
arise.
Definition 6 (Validity in LSG) A formula φ is valid in a model M, denoted M | φ,
whenever M, w | φ for all w ∈ W . A formula is valid in a frame F whenever it
is valid in all models M = 〈F, V 〉. Finally, a formula is valid in a class of models
M whenever it is valid in all models M ∈ M. Validity with respect to classes of frames
is defined in the same way.
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The nominals and propositions are interpreted in the same way. It is the special
clause on the valuation function V that turns the former into real “names” for states.
The epistemic operator Ki is interpreted just as in standard epistemic logic, Kiφ being
true at a state w whenever it is true in all states that i considers possible at w. The
intention operator Ii is interpreted similarly: it is true at a state w whenever φ is true
in all states that are compatible with i’s intentions at w.
LSG is quite an expressive language, but a standard argument shows that it is invari-
ant under hybrid bisimulation (Areces and ten Cate 2007, p. 839). I make extensive
use of this expressiveness in Sect. 2, where I generalize van Hees and Roy’s (2008)
analysis of intention-based transformations of strategic games. For the present it is
sufficient to point out that LSG can express strategy choices and knowledge thereof




σ i plays strategy si
si → Ki si Knowledge of strategy choice
The reader can check that
∨
σ(i)=si σ is true in a model exactly at those states where
i plays strategy si , and I abbreviate this formula by si . In turn, the formula si → Ki si
corresponds, in the technical sense (Blackburn et al. 2001), to the fact that for any two
states, if w ∼i w′ then w(i) = w′(i).
1.2.3 Axiomatization
The set of valid formulas of LSG over the class of epistemic models with intentions is
completely axiomatized by logic LSG , generated by the axioms and inference rules
presented in Table 3. That the epistemic fragment is axiomatized by the S5 axioms
does not come as a surprise, given that ∼i is an equivalence relation. The intention
fragment is in turn axiomatized by the basic modal axiom K and (Ser), which ensures
that the relation ιi is “serial”, in the sense that it is never the case that ιi (w) is the
empty set. A brief syntactic derivation shows that (Ser) does indeed ensure “internal
consistency” of intentions, as it implies ¬Ii⊥. Finally, the interactions axioms enforce
the required interplay between the various components of epistemic frames with inten-
tions. (IncE ) makes E a global modality, while (K-I) and (K-strat) respectively ensure
knowledge of one’s own intentions and own strategy choice.
I only sketch the proof of Theorem 1 below, the details are given in Appendix 4.2.
Theorem 1 The logic LSG is complete with respect to the class of epistemic models
with intentions.
Proof The proof is a collage of known techniques for the various fragments of LSG .
The first part amounts to ensuring that we can build a named and pasted model for
any consistent set of formulas in LSG . In such models all properties definable by a
pure formula, i.e. a formula with only nominals as atoms, are cannonical (ten Cate
2005, p. 69). During the construction of the named model we also make sure that it
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Table 3 The axiom system for
LSG . Here <>i is ♦i or ii
– All propositional tautologies.
– Intention fragment:
(K) Ii (φ → ψ) → (Ii φ → Ii ψ)
(Ser) Ii φ → ii φ
– Epistemic fragment: S5 axioms.
(K) Ki (φ → ψ) → (Ki φ → Ki ψ)
(4) Ki φ → Ki Ki φ
(5) ¬Ki φ → Ki ¬Ki φ
(T) Ki φ → φ
– Hybrid fragment: S5 axioms for E and:
(IncE−σ ) E(σ ∧ φ) → A(σ → φ)
(Existsσ ) E(σ )
– Interaction axioms.
(IncE ) <> φ → Eφ
(K-I) Ii φ → Ki Ii φ
(K-strat) si → Ki si
– (Nec) for all modal connective, and the following
additional inference rules. In both cases σ 	= σ ′ and
the former does not occur in φ.
• (Name) From σ → φ infer φ.
• (Paste) From (E(σ ′∧ <> σ) ∧ E(σ ∧ φ)) → ψ infer
E(σ ′∧ <> φ) → ψ
contains enough states to prove an existence lemma for E . All this is routine for hybrid
logic completeness. Most definitions and lemmas come from (Blackburn et al. 2001,
pp. 434–445) and (Gargov and Goranko 1993). For the other fragments of LSG ,
standard arguments show the required existence and truth lemmas for Ki and Ii . The
proof is completed by ensuring that the model can be seen as an epistemic model with
intentions. This is a more or less direct consequence of the aforementioned canonicity
of pure formulas and the various interaction axioms.
1.3 Dynamic-epistemic logic for information and intentions changes in strategic
games
In this section, I expand LSG with the operator for “public announcements” (van
Ditmarsch et al. 2007) in order to study the dynamic interplay of intentions and infor-
mation in epistemic models with intentions. Just as in the preceding section, I first
define the syntax and the semantics of this dynamic extension, and then provide a
complete axiomatization for the intended class of frames and its dynamics.
In the process I enter the realm of intention revision, as the intentions of an agents
might have to be changed drastically in light of new information. Intention revision is a
complex issue, which I cannot attempt to cover here in any depth. Rather, I here adopt
a simple intention revision policy in order to illustrate how the dynamic language for
epistemic frames provides a unifying umbrella for research on intentions in strategic
interaction.
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1.3.1 Language
The dynamic extension of the language DLGF is defined in a way that is now standard
in the dynamic-epistemic logic literature, i.e., by simply adding “public announce-
ment” operators to the existing syntax. The resulting logical system comes close to
the one proposed by ten Cate (2002). More sophisticated dynamic-epistemic logics
have been developed, see for instance van Ditmarsch et al. (2007) and van Benthem
(2007a), but as the reader will see, the current framework already provides sufficient
tools to capture important aspects of information and intentions in strategic interaction.
Definition 7 (DLGF ) DLGF , the dynamic extension of LSG , is recursively defined
as follows:
φ ::= p | σ | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | Kiφ | Iiφ | Eφ | [φ!]φ
The only new formulas in this language are of the form [φ!]ψ , and should be read
as “after truthfully announcing that φ, it is the case that ψ”.
1.3.2 Contracted models and simple intention revisions
Public announcements are “epistemic actions” which bring new hard information (van
Benthem 2007a) in a given epistemic model. Information is said to be hard when it
is true, and unquestionably so. It overrides any prior information that an agent might
have. In contrast, soft information (idem), is information that the agents only accept
with caution, if at all. Here I focus on public announcements of hard information,
leaving aside softer forms of epistemic action.
The effect of such incoming hard information on an agent’s epistemic states is
relatively uncontroversial and quite well understood. In an epistemic model the infor-
mation of an agent is always truthful, in the sense that if Kiφ holds at a state w
then φ also holds at w. Such information can thus never be contradicted by a public
announcement of hard information, whatever that is, because such announcements
are by definition truthful. In view of this the natural way to update an agent’s episte-
mic state after an announcement of φ is simply to discard all the states which were
considered possible before this announcement in which φ did not hold (Plaza 1989;
Gerbrandy 1999).
The case of intention revision in the light of a public announcement is more intri-
cate because such an announcement, despite its truthfulness, can contradict an agents
intentions. The situation here is similar to the one studied in belief revision theory
(Alchourron et al. 1985; Rott 2001). Just as a belief that φ can be mistaken, and thus
contradicted by a truthful announcement of ¬φ, an agent can have the intention that
φ at state w, in the technical sense of M, w | Iiφ, even when M, w | ¬φ. In such a
case simply discarding from i’s intentions all the states where φ does not hold would
leave him with inconsistent intentions. To avoid this one must look for more subtle
intention revision policies.
In what follows I use the following simple policy, which is designed to preserve
intention consistency while avoiding the introduction of more technical machinery.
123 [902]
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Fig. 2 The intention restriction
when ιi (w)∩ ||φ|| 	= ∅
This policy divides into two cases: the consistent case, when what is announced is
consistent with one’s intentions; and the revision case, when the announcement con-
tradicts one’s intentions. In the consistent case I shall assume that the agent retains
in his intentions only those states that satisfy the hard information he just received.
In the revision case I shall assume that the agent throws away the old, unachievable
intentions but refrains from committing to anything other than what he already knows
to be the case.
Definition 8 (Contracted models) Given a model M and a formula φ ∈ DLGF , the
contracted model M|φ is defined as follows.
1. W|φ = ||φ||M.
2. The relation ∼i |φ is the restriction of ∼i to W|φ .
3. For all w ∈ W|φ . The set ιi |φ(w) is defined as ||φ|| ∩ ιi (w) if ||φ|| ∩ ι(w) 	= ∅,
and as W|φ otherwise.
4. V|φ is the restriction of V to W|φ .
The domain W|φ of a model restricted to φ is just what one would expect: the set
of states where φ was the case before the announcement, with the epistemic relations
modified accordingly.
The restriction of the intention relation ιi corresponds to the revision policy just
described. On the one hand, if what is announced was compatible with the agent’s
intention, that is if ||φ||∩ιi (w) 	= ∅, then the agent adapts his intention to the announce-
ment. Formally, the new intention set is built by taking the restriction of the agent’s
intention to the states compatible with the formula announced: ιi |φ(w) = ||φ||∩ ιi (w).
This case is illustrated in Fig. 2. In the revision case, where the announcement is not
compatible with what the agent intends, that is when ιi (w) ∩ ||φ|| = ∅, the agent’s
intention revision boils down to his not forming any new specific intentions, which
formally gives ιi |φ(w) = W|φ . This is illustrated in Fig. 3.
This simple revision policy is a starting point which has the advantage of using only
existing resources of epistemic models with intentions. More sophisticated revisions
would draw from the extensive formal literature on belief revision, see e.g. the two
publications cited above, as well as from the discussions in philosophy of action, e.g.
in Bratman (1987). See van der Hoek et al. (2007) for a recent attempt in this direction.
It is important to observe that V|φ might be undefined for certain nominals, as the
state they denote might have been removed by the announcement of φ. The model M|φ ,
[903] 123
302 Synthese (2009) 171:291–320
Fig. 3 The intention restriction when ιi (w)∩ ||φ|| = ∅
in other words, might not fall within the class of models delimited by Definition 1.2.2.
This complication is dealt with in the next section by a slight modification of the truth
conditions for nominals after public announcements.
1.3.3 Truth and validity in DLGF
Formulas of DLGF are evaluated on epistemic models with intentions precisely like
those of LSG , except for the public announcement formulas, which are evaluated in
contracted models.
Definition 9 (Truth for public announcement formulas)
M, w | [φ!]ψ iff If M, w | φ then M|φ,w | ψ.
The condition “If M, w | φ then...” ensures that we are dealing with truthful
announcements.
As noted above, the truth conditions for nominals need to be revisited in the context
of public announcements, as the valuation function V might become partial in M|φ .
Definition 10 (Truth for nominals in contracted models) Given an epistemic model
with intentions M, a formula φ of DLGF and the contracted model M|φ :
M|φ,w | σ iff V|φ(σ ) is well-defined and w ∈ V|φ(σ ).
Validity with respect to (classes of) frames and models is defined precisely as for
LSG .
1.3.4 Axiomatization
The logic DLGF is generated by all axioms and inference rules of LSG , together
with the “reduction” formulas (van Ditmarsch et al. 2007, p. 88) of Table 4.
These formulas show how to decompose post-announcement conditions in terms of
pre-announcement ones. Formulas 1–4 are known from the dynamic-epistemic logic
literature.
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Table 4 The reduction axioms
for DLGF . Here [·] is either A
or Ki
1. [φ!]x ↔ φ → x for x ∈ prop ∪ S.
2. [φ!]¬ψ ↔ φ → ¬[φ!]ψ .
3. [φ!]ψ ∧ ξ ↔ φ → ([φ!]ψ ∧ [φ!]ξ).
4. [φ!][·]ψ ↔ φ → [·](φ → [φ!]ψ)
5. [φ!]Ii ψ ↔ φ → (ii φ ∧ Ii (φ → [φ!]ψ) ∨ (¬ii φ ∧ [φ!]Aψ))
Clause 1 is of special importance for the completeness result below. It shows that
any formula whose evaluation potentially involves moving outside the class of episte-
mic model with intentions, that is to move to models where the valuation function is
undefined for some nominals, is equivalent to a formula of LSG , whose evaluation is
done completely within the intended class of models. In other words, by the complete-
ness result of Sect. 1.2.3, any formula satisfiable in a contracted model is equivalent to
a formula of LSG , satisfiable in an epistemic model with intentions. Note that this is
crucially due to the fact that I only allow the valuation function to become undefined
for some nominals after a public announcement. A fully general treatment, involving
undefined or “partially denoting” nominals even before model contraction, requires
some modification of the axiomatic system. See Hansen (2009) for details.
Formula 4 covers the epistemic and the global modalities, and formula 5 encodes
the intention revision policy just discussed. Not surprisingly, the latter matches the
two cases of the update rule for ιi . If the intentions of i were already compatible
with the announcement of φ at state w in a model M, that is if M, w | iiφ, then all
φ-states compatible with i’s intentions should satisfy ψ after the announcement, which
is essentially what Ii (φ → [φ!]ψ) states. On the other hand, if the announcement of
φ was not compatible with i’s intentions, i.e. if M, w | ¬iiφ, then i intends that ψ
after the announcement if and only if ψ is true everywhere in the restricted model, i.e.
[φ!]Aψ , which is exactly what the intention revision rule for ιi prescribes.
The argument in Appendix 4.3 shows that the formulas of Table 4 are valid with
respect to the class of epistemic models with intentions and their transformation via
public announcements, which is enough to show the following:
Theorem 2 The logic DLGF is complete with respect to the class of epistemic game
models with intentions.
2 Applications
In this section I apply DLGF and its associated logic DLGF to generalize the inves-
tigation of van Hees and Roy (2008) and Roy (2009) concerning the role of intentions
in the transformation of decision problems. More precisely, I answer the four open
questions mentioned in the introduction: provide an epistemic characterization of the
operation they call “cleaning”; analyze the behaviour of this operation in situations
where there is uncertainty about intentions; relate this to other intention-based trans-
formations of interactive situations; and analyze their iterated behaviour.
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2.1 Cleaning as public announcement of “Intentions-Rationality”
Van Hees and Roy (2008; 2009) define the cleaning operation as a tool for the for-
mal study of the way intentions impose a “filter of admissibility” on the options in
a given decision problem, a phenomenon which has attracted much attention in the
philosophical literature since the work of Bratman (1987). The idea behind cleaning
is that an agent should discard from a given deliberation all the options which would
rule out the achievement of his intentions.
In their framework there is no model of the agents’ information and thus no uncer-
tainty about the agents’ intentions. Taking the present notation, they define cleaning
for a strategic game G with respect to one intention profile ι, where each ιi is a set of
strategy profiles in G. The operation boils down to discarding from each strategy set
Si the elements which could never lead to a profile in the intention set ιi .
In the models of interactive situations I use here, which also includes the agents’
information, assuming that there is no uncertainty about intentions translates into
assuming that these intentions are the same throughout a given epistemic frame with
intentions, or that they are uniform.
Definition 11 (Uniform intentions) I say that intentions are uniform in an epistemic
frame with intentions F whenever, for all w,w′ ∈ W and i ∈ A, ιi (w) = ιi (w′).
Uniform intentions are always common knowledge. When intentions are uniform
then at each state all agents not only know the intentions of others, but also know that
everybody knows the intentions of others, and so on for any number of iteration of
“everybody knows”. With this to hand I can readily transpose van Hees and Roy’s
notion of cleaning into epistemic models with intentions:
Definition 12 (Cleaning) For a game in strategic form G and an epistemic model with
intentions M where intentions are uniform, the cleaned strategy set cl(Si ) from the
perspective of ιi is defined as
cl(Si ) = {si | there is a w ∈ ιi such that w(i) = si }
The cleaned version of F, denoted clι(F), is the tuple 〈cl(W ), {∼cli , ιcli }i∈N 〉 where:
– cl(W ) = {w | ∃i such that w(i) ∈ cl(Si )}.
– ∼cli and V cl are restrictions of ∼i and V to cl(W ).
– For all i , ιcli = cl(W ) ∩ ιi .
Cleaning is intended to capture the idea that agents remove from their strategy sets
those strategies that would never lead to an intended state. Consider again the game
in Table 1, with the model as in Fig. 1 and the intentions as follows: ιAnn(w) = {w1}
and ιBob(w) = {w1, w4} for all w ∈ W . A first round of cleaning for Ann removes
Restaurant B from her strategy set, and by the same token w3 and w4. Intentions are
uniform here, and so Bob knows that Ann cleans her strategy set this way, and he adapts
his own intentions accordingly: ιclBob = {w1}. In this reduced model Restaurant B
becomes incompatible with Bob’s intentions, and so one further round of cleaning
leaves only w1, the only state compatible with Ann and Bob’s intentions.
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Fig. 4 The model for the proof
of Fact 4, based on the game in
Table 1. Only the epistemic
relations are represented
Table 5 The intentions and
strategy choice assignment for
Fig. 4
State f (w) ι1(w) ι2(w)
w1 A − A w2, w4 w3, w4
w2 A − B w3 w1
w3 B − A w2 w4
w4 B − B w4 w4
The idea that a strategy might lead to an intended state is also expressible directly
in LSG , and I call it intention-rationality:
∨
σ(i) = w(i)
iiσ i’s intention-rationality (IRi ) at state w
Intention-rationality boils down to saying that an agent does not choose a strategy
that excludes the achievement of his intentions: the formula above is true at a state
w whenever there is a state compatible with i’s intentions in which he plays the same
strategy as in w. Notice that nominals are crucial in this definition, as they allow one
to refer directly to the states and, in turn, to the strategy that the agents choose at these
states.
Intention-rationality relates the agent’s choice to what he intends, but does not take
into account his information at a particular state. In Fig. 4 and Table 5, for instance,
Ann is intention-rational at w2 even though she knows that her intention is not realiz-
able. This is surely a motivation for considering stronger form of intentions-rationality,
which I do in the next section.
In general, that w′ is compatible with i’s intention at w does not mean that i is inten-
tion-rational at w′, even if in both states this agent plays the same strategy, because
his intentions at w′ might be different from those at w. In models with uniform inten-
tions, however, such a situation cannot arise: agents are intention-rational at least in
the states they intend.
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Proof Take any i ∈ A. We know that ιi 	= ∅. So take any w ∈ ιi . We have that
M, w | iiσ for V (σ ) = w. But by uniformity of intentions we know that ιi (w) = ιi ,
and so that M, w | ∨σ(i) = w(i) iiσ .








Lemma 1 shows that, without uncertainty about intentions, intention-rationality is
always ensured somewhere in the model. Corollary 1, in turn, permits a straightfor-
ward rendering of cleaning in terms of public announcements of intention-rationality.
Fact 1 For any model M where intentions are uniform:
cl(M) = M|∨i∈A I Ri .
Proof We first show that cl(W ) = W|∨i∈A I Ri . We know that w′ ∈ cl(W ) iff there
is an i such that w′(i) ∈ cl(Si ). This, in turn, happens iff there is an i and a w′′ ∈ ιi
such that w′′(i) = w′(i), which is also the same as saying that there is an i such that
M, w′ | ∨σ(i)=w′(i) iiσ . This is equivalent to M, w′ |
∨
i∈A I Ri , which finally
boils down to w′ ∈ W|∨i∈A I Ri . It should then be clear that the restricted cleaned rela-
tions and valuation correspond to those obtained from the announcement of
∨
i∈A I Ri ,
and vice versa. It remains to consider the update of the intention sets. Observe that by
Corollary 1 we know that the second clause of the update rule of ιi is never used when
intentions are uniform, from which we get directly that ιcli = ιi |∨i∈A I Ri .
The cleaned version of an epistemic model with intentions is thus the same as the
contracted model which results from a public announcement of intention-rationality,
under the condition that intentions are uniform, and thus common knowledge. Clean-
ing in the sense of van Hees and Roy corresponds to a public announcement that the
players do not choose strategies that rule out the achievement of their intentions.
This answers a first question left open by van Hees and Roy, namely, understand-
ing the epistemic assumptions underlying their cleaning operation: it can be seen as
being performed under common knowledge of intention. This is indeed a very strong
condition on what the agents know about each others’ intentions. It presupposes that
all agents are absolutely certain not only about their own intentions and the intentions
of others, but also about what the others know about their intentions. Such hard infor-
mation about intentions and information will, however, rarely obtain in interactive
situations, and in the next sections I relax this assumption, which will at the same time
provide an answer to two other questions left open by van Hees and Roy, namely how
cleaning behaves when there is uncertainty about intentions, and how it is related to
other intentions-based transformations of option sets.
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2.2 Intention-rationality and “knowledge-consistency”
The first step towards generalizing van Hees and Roy’s approach to situations where
intentions are not common knowledge is to observe that the notion of intention-ratio-
nality defined above takes no account of what the agent considers possible at a given
state. As observed earlier, one can easily design a state in a model for a given game
in strategic form where one agent is intention-rational even though he knows that he
cannot realize what he intends.
The following notion, which I call epistemic intention-rationality, parallels the one




(iiσ ∧ ♦iσ) i’s epistemic intention-rationality (IR∗i ) at state w
An agent is epistemically intention-rational at a state w whenever there is a state com-
patible with his intentions which he considers possible and where he plays the same
strategy as in w. That this formula connects the agents’ intentions and information
is even more explicit once one considers the following formula, which states that an
agent should not have intentions which he considers are impossible to realize.
Iiφ → ♦iφ i’s knowledge-consistency of intentions (IKi )
This notion recalls the “strong belief consistency” constraint discussed in the philo-
sophical literature Bratman (1987, p. 31). In contrapositive, it says that an agent’s
intentions should always be at least compatible with his hard information at a state,
i.e. with what he knows to be the case. Knowledge-consistency and epistemic inten-
tion-rationality turn out to be semantically equivalent.
Fact 2 At any pointed model M, w, M, w | I Ki iff M, w | I R∗i .
Proof It should be clear that I Ki → I Ri , which means that all that remains to be
shown is the right-to-left direction. We show it in contrapositive. Assume that M, w |
Iiφ ∧ Ki¬φ for some φ. This means that ιi (w) ⊆ ||φ|| and that ||φ|| ∩ [w]i = ∅.
We thus have ιi (w) ∩ [w]i = ∅. But this means that for all σ ′ and w′(i) = w(i)
such that V (σ ′) = w′ and w′ ∈ [w]i , M, w | ¬iiσ ′. In other words, M, w |∧
σ ′(i)=si ♦iσ
′ → ¬iiσ ′.
Knowledge-consistency clearly implies intention-rationality, but not the other way
around. Look for example at the state w1 in Fig. 4. Ann is intention-rational but her
intentions are knowledge-inconsistent at that state.
Intention-rationality and its epistemic variant are both fully introspective in episte-
mic game models with intentions, essentially because agents know their own intentions
and strategy choices. This, again, reveals how intentions and information interact in
such models, which becomes crucial in the analysis of the iterated announcements of
these two notions.
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Fact 3 (Positive and negative introspection of I Ri and I R∗i ) For all pointed game
models, M, w | I Ri implies M, w | Ki I Ri and M, w | ¬I Ri implies M, w |
Ki¬I Ri . The same hold for I R∗i .
Proof We only show the positive introspection for I Ri ; the arguments for the other
claims are similar. Assume that M, w | I Ri . This happens if and only if there is
a w′ ∈ ιi (w) such that w′(i) = w(i). Take any w′′ ∈ [w]i . We know that ιi (w′′) =
ιi (w), which means that w′ is also in ιi (w′′), and w′′(i) = w(i), which means that
w′′(i) = w′(i), and so that M, w′′ | I Ri .
2.3 Iterated announcements of intention-rationality and knowledge-consistency
By showing that cleaning corresponds to a specific public announcement in DLGF ,
I have in fact opened the door to using the expressive power of this language to
analyze a whole range of alternative intentions-based transformations of interactive
situations, i.e. alternative public announcements related to what agents intend and
know in a specific interactive situation. In this section I focus on an obvious candi-
date: announcement of knowledge consistency. I compare it to cleaning, in both the
one-shot and iterated cases, and both with and without uncertainty about intentions,
thus answering the three remaining open questions mentioned at the beginning of this
section.
A first thing to observe about the announcements of intention-rationality, i.e. clean-
ing, and of knowledge consistency, which I call epistemic cleaning, is that they are
both self-fulfilling when intentions are common knowledge. Under this assumption,
intention-rationality and knowledge consistency hold everywhere in the model that
results from a single public announcement of one or the other. In the general case,
however, this is only true of knowledge-consistency.
Definition 13 (Self-fulfilling announcements) An announcement that φ is said to be
self-fulfilling at a pointed model M, w if M, w | [φ!]Aφ.
Fact 4 The announcement of
∨
i∈A I Ri is self-fulfilling for any pointed model M, w
when intentions are common knowledge, but this not the case in general.
Proof For the first part, we have to show that for any pointed model with common
knowledge of intentions, if M, w | ∨i∈I I Ri then M|∨i∈A I Ri , w | A
∨
i∈A I Ri .
We show something stronger, namely that for all w ∈ ||I Ri ||, M|I Ri , w | A I Ri .
Take any w′ ∈ W|I Ri . We have to show that there is a w′′ in ιi |I Ri (w′) such that w′′(i) =
w′(i). Because w′ ∈ W|I Ri we know that w′ was in ||I Ri || before the announcement.
But this means that there was a w′′ ∈ ιi (w′) such that w′′(i) = w′(i). But since ιi (w)
is the same for all w ∈ W , by assumption, we know that w′′ was also in ||I Ri ||. This
means, in turn, that ιi |I Ri (w′) = ιi |I Ri (w′)∩ ||I Ri ||, and so that w′′ ∈ ιi |I Ri (w′), as
required.
For the second part, take the set of states in Fig. 4 with the intentions and strategy
choice as in Table 5. The announcement of
∨
i∈A I Ri removes w2 and w3, making
both agents intention-irrational at w1.
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Fact 5 The announcement of
∨
i∈A I R∗i is self-fulfilling for any pointed model M, w.
Proof The proof follows the same line as in the previous fact. Namely, we show that if
M, w | I R∗i then M|∨i∈A I R∗i , w | A I R∗i . The reasoning is entirely similar. Take
any w′ ∈ W|I R∗ . We know that ιi (w′)∩ [w′]i 	= ∅. Now take any w′′ in this inter-
section. Because w′′ ∼i w′, we know that ιi (w′′) = ιi (w′) and that w′′(i) = w′(i).
Furthermore, because ∼i is an equivalence relation we know that [w′′]i = [w′]i . This
means that w′′ ∈ ||I R∗i ||. This gives us that ιi |I R∗i (w′) = ιi (w′)∩ ||I R∗i || and also that
w′′ ∈ ιi |I R∗i (w′)∩ [w′]i |I R∗i , as required.
These two facts show that epistemic cleaning does indeed compensate for uncer-
tainty about intentions, something that is beyond the reach of non-epistemic cleaning.
One announcement of intention-rationality can make some agents intention-irrational
when there is uncertainty about what the others intend, but this cannot happen when
knowledge-consistency is announced.
Announcing intention-rationality is self-fulfilling if it is repeated often enough,
though, and this is a more or less direct consequence of the simple intention-revision
policy that I defined above. To see this requires two prefatory facts: one which states
that the intention revision policy indeed always preserves consistency, and the other
that repeated announcement of intention-consistency stabilizes after a finite number
of steps.
Fact 6 M | ∧i∈A[φ!]ii for all models for game structure M.
Proof We show the validity of ∧i∈A[φ!]ii via a syntactic derivation and Theorem 2.
See Appendix 4.4 for details.
Definition 14 (Announcement stabilization) Given a pointed game model M, w, let
M
k|φ,w be the pointed model that results after announcing k times φ at w. The
announcement of φ stabilizes at k for M, w whenever Mk|φ,w = Mk+1|φ ,w.
The announcement of intention-rationality does indeed stabilize, in this technical
sense. The details of the proof of this fact are given in Appendix 4.5.
Fact 7 (Stabilization of [∨i∈A I Ri !]) For any pointed model M, w, the announce-
ment of
∨
i∈A I Ri stabilizes at some k.
Putting these two together, we directly obtain the following.
Corollary 2 At any k where the announcement of intention-rationality stabilizes for
a given pointed model M, w:
M
k




With this in hand, it is straightforward to get the following.
Fact 8 (Self-fulfilling of [∨i∈A I Ri !] at the stabilization point) At any k where[∨i∈A I Ri !] stabilizes, Mk|∨i∈A I Ri , w | A
∨
i∈A I Ri .
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Table 6 The intentions of the







Proof Assume the contrary, then there is a w′∈W k|∨i∈A I Ri such that M
k
|∨i∈A I Ri , w |
¬∨i∈A I Ri . But then w 	∈ Mk+1|∨i∈A I Ri , against the assumption that the announcement
of
∨
i∈A I Ri stabilizes at k.
This means that, even though non-epistemic cleaning is not necessarily self-ful-
filling after one announcement, it is in the long run. The route to a stable contracted
epistemic model with intentions is much quicker with epistemic cleaning, though.
Fact 9 For any pointed model M, w, the announcement of
∨
i∈A I R∗i stabilizes after
one announcement.
Proof By definition, W|∨i∈A I R∗i =||
∨
i∈A I R∗i ||. But we also know from Fact 5 that
for all w′ in W|∨i∈A I R∗i , M|
∨
i∈A I R∗i , w
′|∨i∈A I R∗i . This means that M2|∨i∈A I R∗i =
M|∨i∈A I R∗i .
Moreover, as the example in the proof of Fact 4 suggests, these stabilization points can
be different.
Fact 10 (Fixed points divergence) There exist models M where the announcement of
intention-rationality stabilizes at k such that:
M|∨i∈A I R∗i 	= Mk|∨i∈A I Ri
Proof Take a model M with two agents and four states, w1 to w4, where the strategies
are as in Fact 4, and [w]i = {w} for all states. Fix the intentions as in Table 6. It
should be clear that in all states, M, w | ∨i∈A I Ri . This means that for all states,
M|∨i∈A I Ri , w = M, w, i.e. this announcement does not remove any states, and so that
M is its own stabilization point. Observe, on the other hand, that M, w2 	| ∨i∈A I R∗i .
But since ι1(w1) = {w2}, we get ι1,|∨i∈A I R∗i (w1) = {w1, w3, w4} after the announce-
ment of knowledge-consistency at w1. But then it is clear that ι1,|∨i∈A I R∗i (w1) 	=
ι1,|∨i∈A I Ri (w1), and since in this case the announcement of
∨
i∈A I Ri “stabilizes”
at k = 0, we get that M|∨i∈A I R∗i 	= Mk∨i∈A I Ri
This last result shows that the iterated behaviour of the two forms of cleaning does
indeed differ, as the intention revision policy preserves consistency of intentions, but it
sometimes forces agents to adjust their intentions in the face of epistemic cleaning in a
way that would not have been necessary for non-epistemic cleaning. Observe that this
would also be the case if I had used a more sophisticated revision policy. The different
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behaviour of non-epistemic and epistemic cleaning comes from the fact that in this
case the latter, and not the former, forces the agents to revise their intentions, and not
from the way they proceed with this revision.
This difference between the iterated behaviour of epistemic and non-epistemic
cleaning is, however, the only one that can occur: knowledge-consistency is robust to
any number of altruistic cleanings. This is a direct consequence of the fact that knowl-
edge-consistency implies intention-rationality, and that they are both introspective.
Fact 11 For all pointed models M, w, if M, w | ∨i∈A I R∗i then M,
w | [∨i∈A I Ri !]
∨
i∈A I R∗i .
Proof Assume that M, w | ∨i∈A I R∗i , i.e. that there is an i and a w′ ∼i w such that
w′ ∈ ιi (w). Because I R∗i is introspective, this means that M, w′ |
∨
i∈A I R∗i . But
then M, w′ | ∨i∈A I Ri , which means that both w′ and w are in W|∨i∈A I Ri , and
also that w′ ∈ ιi |∨i∈A I Ri (w). But then M, w | [
∨
i∈A I Ri !]
∨
i∈A I R∗i .
From this we also know that the model that would result from epistemic cleaning
is always a sub-model of the one which would result at the stabilization point of the
non-epistemic variant of this operation.
Corollary 3 Suppose that for a pointed model M, w the announcement of intention-














Proof Follows directly from Fact 8, 9 and 11.
Let us wrap up the results from this section. I have answered four questions left
open by van Hees and Roy (2008) and by Roy (2009). I first showed that clean-
ing corresponds to a public announcement of “intention-rationality” under common
knowledge of intentions. Granting that this is quite an strong assumption, I moved
on to an analysis of public announcements of intention-rationality in situations where
agents are uncertain about the intentions of others, and compared it with the announce-
ment of “knowledge-consistency” of intentions. I showed that only this second type
of announcement is “self-fulfilling” when there is uncertainty about intentions, but
that they both are otherwise. I then analyzed the iterated behaviour of these opera-
tions, and showed that they both reach a stabilization point, and studied how these
relate. This allowed us finally to look at the interplay between these two operations,
which revealed that knowledge-consistency is indeed “robust” to announcements of
intention-rationality.
3 Conclusion
In this paper I have proposed a logical system to describe and study reasoning about
information and intentions in interactive situations. I have completely axiomatized
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this system and used it to further the work on intention-based transformation of deci-
sion problem initiated by van Hees and Roy (2008) and Roy (2009), by answering
four questions left open by their approach. All in all, I have provided a framework
that merges insights from and contributes to three strong traditions in the study of
rational agency: dynamic epistemic logic, epistemic game theory and philosophy of
action.
Three issues need most urgent investigation: the connection between intentions and
preferences, the relation between the present framework and the BDI (Belief-Desire-
Intention) architectures for multi-agent systems, e.g. Cohen and Levesque (1990);
Georgeff et al. (1999) and Wooldridge (2000), and extensions to more subtle policies
of intention revision. In this paper I have completely left aside the question of how
intentions should relate to preferences, and whether the dynamic processes that I stud-
ied could, or maybe should, be reduced to known preference-based transformation of
games in strategic form, for instance iterated elimination of strictly dominated strate-
gies. This is an important question, which would help to understand how the approach
studied here relates to mainstream game theory. Although very similar in method and
aims, the BDI models have not been developed for direct application to games in
strategic forms, which makes it at the least non-trivial to see how they relate to the
logical system presented here. The investigation into more subtle intention revision
policies will require the extension of the already quite loaded framework with even
more technical machinery, and this is the main reason why I have not taken up this task
here. This paper provides a good understanding of the basic dynamics of epistemic
models with intentions, though, and with this to hand I believe it would be timely to
move to such richer models.
4 Appendix
4.1 Model-theoretic definition of common knowledge
Given a group of agents G ⊆ A and a model M, let ∼∗G denote the reflexive-transitive
closure of the union of the relations ∼i for all i ∈ G. Denote [w]∗G the set of state
w′ such that w ∼∗G w′. The formula φ is common knowledge among G at state w
whenever M, w′ | φ for all w′ ∈ [w]∗G .
This definition is well known to correspond, at the syntactic level, to the infinite
conjunction of “everybody knows that...” mentioned in Sect. 1.2.1. See e.g. (Fagin
et al. 1995). The reader can also check that the notion of uniform intentions defined
in Sect. 2.1 does indeed imply that intentions are common knowledge in the present
sense.
4.2 Proof of theorem 1
Definition 15 (Named and pasted MCS) Let  be a maximally consistent set (MCS)
of LSG . We say that  is named by σ if σ ∈ . If σ names some MSC(s) 
we denote it (them) σ .  is pasted whenever E(σ∧ <> φ) ∈  implies that
E(σ∧ <> σ ′) ∧ E(σ ′ ∧ φ) is also in .
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Lemma 2 (Extended Lindenbaum lemma) (Blackburn etal. 2001, p.441) Let S′ be a
countable collection of nominals disjoint from S, and let LSG ′ be LSG ∪S′. Then every
LSG consistent set of formulas can be extended to a named and pasted LSG ′ -MCS.
Proof Naming Enumerate S′, and let σ be the first new nominal in that
enumeration. For a given consistent set ∗, fix σ =  ∪ {σ }. By (Name) σ is
consistent. Pasting Enumerate the formulas of LSG ′ and take 0 = σ . Assume n
is defined, and let φn+1 be the nth + 1 formula in the enumeration. Define n+1 as n
if n ∪ {φn+1} is inconsistent. Otherwise form n+1 by adding φn+1 to n if φn+1 is
not of the form E(σ ′ ∧ ψ). If φn+1 is of form E(σ ′ ∧ ψ), then we paste with the first
new nominal σ ′′ in the enumeration of S′. I.e. n+1 = n ∪ {φn+1} ∪ {E(σ ′∧ <>
σ ′′) ∧ E(σ ′′ ∧ φ)}. By (Paste), n+1 is also consistent. Finally, set  = ⋃n≤ω n .
This is clearly a named and pasted MCS.
Definition 16 (Yielded MCS) The sets yielded by a LSG ′ -MCS  are the sets 
σ
such that 
σ = {φ : E(σ ∧ φ) ∈ }.
Lemma 3 (Properties of yielded sets) (Blackburn etal. 2001, p.439) Let 
σ and 
σ ′
be any yielded sets of a LSG ′ -MCS , for arbitrary nominals σ and σ ′ in LSG ′.
1. Both 
σ and 
σ ′ are named ′LSG -MCS.




3. E(σ ∧ φ) ∈ 
σ ′ iff E(σ ∧ φ) ∈ .
4. If σ ′′ names  then  is itself the yielded set 
σ ′′ .
Proof
1. By (Existsσ ), Eσ ∈ , and thus 
σ is named. Assume now it is not consis-
tent. This means that there are ξ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ξn ∈ 
σ such that one can prove
¬(ξ1 ∧· · ·∧ξn) in LSG . But this means that A¬(ξ1 ∧· · ·∧ξn) ∈ , by (Nec).
This, in turns, means that ¬E(ξ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ξn) ∈ . But that cannot hold. Recall
that (ξ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ξn) ∈ 
 iff E(σ ∧ ξ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ξn) is also in . But then by
(K) for E , we get that E(ξ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ξn) ∈ . For maximality, observe that a
formula φ and its negation are not in 
σ iff neither E(σ ∧ φ) nor E(σ ∧ ¬φ)
are in . But because the latter is a MCS, this means that both ¬E(σ ∧ φ) and
¬E(σ ∧ ¬φ) are in . The first formula implies A(σ → ¬φ) ∈ , but then,
given that Eσ ∈ , by standard modal logic reasoning we get that E(σ ∧¬φ),
contradicting the consistency of .
2. Assume σ ′ ∈ 
σ . This means that E(σ ∧ σ ′) ∈ . By (IncE−σ ) we get
that both A(σ → σ ′) and A(σ ′ → σ) are in , and so by K for E , we get
A(σ ↔ σ ′) ∈ . Assume now that φ ∈ 
σ . This means that E(σ ∧ φ) ∈ .
But by standard K reasoning we get that E(σ ′ ∧ φ) ∈ , which means that φ
is also in 
σ ′ . The argument is symmetric for φ ∈ 
σ ′ , and so 
σ = 
σ ′ .
3. We first show the left-to-right direction. Assume that E(σ ′ ∧ φ) ∈ 
σ . This
means that E(σ ∧ E(σ ′ ∧ φ)) ∈ . But then this implies, by K for E that
E E(σ ′ ∧φ) ∈ , which in turn, because of axiom 4 for E , implies E(σ ′ ∧φ) ∈
. For the converse, assume that E(σ ′ ∧φ) ∈ . By axiom 5 for E , we get that
AE(σ ′ ∧ φ) ∈ . But we also know by (Existsσ ) that Eσ ∈ , from which
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we get by standard K reasoning that E(σ ∧ E(σ ′ ∧ φ)) ∈ . This means that
E(σ ′ ∧ φ) ∈ 
σ .
4. Assume that σ ∈ . For left to right, assume that φ ∈ . This means that
σ ∧φ ∈ , which implies by axiom T that E(σ ∧φ) and so that φ ∈ 
σ . Now
assume that φ ∈ 
σ . This means that E(σ ∧φ) ∈ , which in turn implies that
A(σ → φ) by (IncE−σ ). But then by axiom T again we get that σ → φ ∈ ,
and φ itself because σ ∈ .
Definition 17 (Epistemic model for completeness) Let  be any named and pasted
LSG ′ -MCS. The named game model M
 yielded by  is a tuple 〈W,A,∼i , ιi ,
V 〉 such that:
– W is the set of sets yielded by .
– A, defined as {i : there is a <>i φ in LSG}, is the set of agents.
– 
σ ∼i 
σ ′ iff for all φ ∈ 
σ ′ ,♦iφ ∈ 
σ .
– ιi (
σ ) = {
σ ′ : for all φ ∈ 
σ ′ , iiφ ∈ 
σ }.
– For all x ∈ prop ∪ (S ∪ S′), V (x) = {
σ : x ∈ 
σ }.
Lemma 4 (Existence Lemma for Eφ, Ii and Ki ) If ♦iφ ∈ 
σ then there is a 
σ ′ ∈ W
such that φ ∈ 
σ ′ and 
σ ∼i 
σ ′ . Similarly for Iiφ and Eφ. Furthermore, if φ ∈ 
σ
then for all 
σ ′ , Eφ ∈ 
σ ′ .
Proof (Blackburn et al. 2001, p. 442) for Ki and Ii . The argument for Eφ, including
the “furthermore” part, is a direct application of Lemma 3.
Lemma 5 (Truth Lemma) For all φ ∈ , M,
σ | φ iff φ ∈ 
σ .
Proof By induction on φ. The basic cases, including the nominals, are obvious. The
inductive cases is a standard modal logic argument from Lemma 4.
All that remains to be shown is that M is indeed an epistemic model with inten-
tions. We start by looking at the epistemic relation ∼i .
Lemma 6 (Adequacy of ∼i - Part I) The relation ∼i is an equivalence relation.
Proof All S5 axioms are canonical (Blackburn et al. 2001, p. 203).
This means that {[
σ ]i : 
σ ∈ W} partitions the set W , for each agent. We use
these partitions directly to define the strategic choices at each 
σ . That is, for each
“state” 
σ , we set f (
σ )(i) = [
′σ ]i such that 
σ ∈ [
′σ ]i . By the previous lemma
we automatically get that this function is well-defined. The rest of the adequacy lemma
for ∼i is then easy.
Lemma 7 (Adequacy of ∼i - Part II) For all 
σ and 





σ ′(i) and ιi (
σ ) = ιi (
′σ ).
Proof The first part is a trivial consequence of the way we set up 
σ (i). For the
second part, observe that by the definition of ιi all we need to show is that for all
|φ| ∈ ιi (
σ ), |φ| is also in ιi (
σ ′), with |φ| = {
σ ∈ W : φ ∈ 
σ }. So assume
the first. This means that Iiφ ∈ 
σ , which means by (K-I) that Ki Iiφ is also in 
σ .
But then, because 
σ ∼i 
σ ′ , we obtain by a routine modal logic argument that
Iiφ ∈ 
σ ′ , which is just to say, |φ| is also in ιi (
σ ′).
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Lemma 8 (Adequacy of ιi ) For all 
σ , ιi (
σ ) does not contain the empty set.
Proof Follows directly from the canonicity of (Ser).
4.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We define DLGF as LSG together with the formulas in Table 4. Showing complete-
ness boils down to showing soundness for these new axioms (van Ditmarsch et al.
2007).
Proof Soundness of the first four axioms is well known, except for the nominal case.
For this case take an arbitrary pointed model M, w, and assume that M, w | [!φ]σ .
This happens iff M|φ,w | σ whenever M, w | φ. Now if the antecedent holds,
then w ∈ W|φ and so V|φ(σ ) is well defined, and so that M|φ,w | σ iff V|φ(σ ) iff
w ∈ V (σ ) iff M, w | σ , as required. The other direction is completely analogous.
It remains to be shown that the fifth axiom is valid. Take an arbitrary pointed model
for game a structure M, w, and assume that M, w | φ (otherwise we are done) and
that M, w | [φ!]Iiψ . This means that for all w′ ∈ ιi |φ(w), M|φ,w′ | ψ . There are
two cases to consider.
1. ||φ|| ∩ ιi (w) 	= ∅. This means that M, w | iiφ. We have to show that M, w |
Ii (φ → [φ!]ψ) as well. Take w′ ∈ ιi (w) and assume that M, w′ | φ, for
otherwise the implication is trivially satisfied. Because of this, we know that
w′ ∈ W|φ , and by the definition of ιi we know that w′ ∈ ιi |φ(w) as well. But then
by assumption we know that M|φ,w′ | ψ , which means that M, w′ | [φ!]ψ .
2. ||φ||∩ ιi (w) = ∅. In this case we have that M, w | ¬iiφ, so it remains to
show that M, w | [φ!]Aψ , that is that M|φ,w′ | ψ for all w′ ∈ W|φ . Take a
w′ ∈ ιi |φ(w). By assumption we know that M|φ,w′ | ψ , but because ||φ||∩ ↓
ιi (w) = ∅ we also know that ιi |φ(w) = W|φ , and so we are done.
4.4 Proof of Fact 6
In this proof the numbers refer to Table 4.
We start with [φ!]¬Ii⊥, which is the same as [φ!]ii. By (2), this is equivalent to
φ → ¬[φ!]Ii⊥
Now, by (5), the consequent expands into two parts  = iiφ ∧ Ii (φ → [φ!]⊥) and
 = ¬iiφ ∧ [φ!]A⊥, which we treat separately to keep the formulas readable.
φ → ¬(φ → ( ∨ )).
Before looking at each disjunct, some redundancy can be eliminated by propositional
reasoning, to get:
φ → ¬( ∨ )
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Now let us look first at  = iiφ ∧ Ii (φ → [φ!]⊥). By (1) we get
iiφ ∧ Ii (φ → (φ → ⊥))
because ⊥ can be treated as a propositional atom. This is equivalent in propositional
logic to:
iiφ ∧ Ii (¬φ).
But the second conjunct is just the negation of the first, which means that  is just
equivalent to ⊥. We are thus left with:
φ → ¬(⊥ ∨ )
Which is just the same as:
φ → ¬
Now, recall that ψ is the following:
¬iiφ ∧ [φ!]A⊥
By (4), this expands to:
¬iiφ ∧ A(φ → [φ!]⊥)
By (1) again, we thus get:
¬iiφ ∧ A(φ → (φ → ⊥)).
This again reduces to:
¬iiφ ∧ A(¬φ).
Putting this back in the main formula, we get:
φ → ¬(¬iiφ ∧ A(¬φ)).
But then propositional reasoning gets us:
(φ ∧ A¬φ) → iiφ.
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which is propositionally equivalent to . Since we took an arbitrary i , we can conclude
that this is also the case for
∧
i∈A[φ!]ii.
4.5 Proof of Fact 7
We provide here a direct proof of stabilization, because the announcement we ana-
lyze is not a monotone map. Had that been the case, i.e. if it were the case that
M|∨i∈A I Ri ⊆ M′|∨i∈A I Ri provided that M ⊆ M
′
, then the existence of a stabiliza-
tion point would have been ensured by Tarski’s fixed point theorem. We indeed have
that W|∨i∈A I Ri ⊆ W ′|∨i∈A I Ri if M ⊆ M
′
. The non-monotonicity of this announce-
ment lies in the update rule for the intention set. One can easily devise an example
where M ⊆ M′ but in which there is a w ∈ W and an i ∈ A such that ιi |∨i∈A I Ri (w) 	⊆
ι′i |∨i∈A I Ri (w).
Proof Assume that there is no such k. This means that there is no k such that
M
k
|∨i∈A I Ri , w = M
k+1
|∨i∈A I Ri , w. Since we are working with finite models, this means
that there is a finite n-step loop where Mk|∨i∈A I Ri = M
k+n+1
|∨i∈I I Ri such that
M
k
|∨i∈A I Ri , w 	= M
k+1
|∨i∈A I Ri , w 	= · · · 	= M
k+n
|∨i∈A I Ri 	= M
k+n+1
|∨i∈A I Ri
Now, observe that by Definition 8:
W k|∨i∈A I Ri ⊇ W
k+1
|∨i∈A I Ri ⊇ · · · ⊇ W
k+n
|∨i∈A I Ri ⊇ W
k+n+1
|∨i∈A I Ri
But since Mk|∨i∈A I Ri = M
k+n+1
|∨i∈A I Ri , all these inclusions are in fact equalities.
W k|∨i∈A I Ri = W
k+1
|∨i∈A I Ri = · · · = W
k+n
|∨i∈A I Ri = W
k+n+1
|∨i∈A I Ri
Given the definition of the relation ∼i , it must then be that for all 0 ≤  ≤ n, there is
a i ∈ A and a w ∈ W k+|∨i∈A I Ri such that ι
k+
i,|∨i∈A I Ri (w) 	= ι
k++1
i |∨i∈A I Ri (w). But this
cannot be, as the following two cases show, and so there cannot be such a loop.
1. Assume that:






k+ 	= ∅ (1)
This means that:
ιk++1i |∨i∈A I Ri (w)=
(







But observe that, because W k++1|∨i∈A I Ri = W
k+






k+ = W k++1|∨i∈A I Ri
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This means that:
ιk++1i |∨i∈A I Ri (w)=(ι
k+
i |∨i∈A I Ri (w) ∩ W
k+
|∨i∈A I Ri )=ι
k+
i |∨i∈A I Ri (w)=ι
k+
i |∨i∈A I Ri (w)
So (1) cannot hold while:
ιk+i |∨i∈A I Ri (w) 	= ι
k++1
i |∨i∈A I Ri (w)
2. Assume then that:






k+ = ∅ (2)
In this case ιk++1i |∨i∈A I Ri (w) just becomes W
k++1
|∨i∈A I Ri . But recall that by defini-
tion, W k++1|∨i∈A I Ri is just ||
∨
i∈A I Ri ||k+. But since we know that W k++1|∨i∈A I Ri =
W k+|∨i∈A I Ri , this means that ||
∨
i∈A I Ri ||k+ = W k+|∨i∈A I Ri . But that would
mean:
ιk+i |∨i∈A I Ri (w)∩ W
k+
|∨i∈A I Ri = ∅
which is just to say that
ιk+i |∨i∈A I Ri (w) = ∅
which is impossible by Fact 6.
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